Is patent reform a fad? Do firms really misuse the patent system? Those were some of the questions addressed by a panel of distinguished researchers during a conference on "patent policy and innovation" organized by TILEC and the University of Bologna, Italy, this November. The speakers (Alfonso Gambardella (Bocconi), Richard Gilbert (Berkeley), John Golden (Texas Law), Dietmar Harhoff (Munich), Gerard Llobet (CEMFI, Madrid), Klaus Schmidt (Munich), Richard Schmalensee (MIT), and Damien Geradin (TILEC)) discussed the evidence showing that the increase in the numbers of patent applications and granted patents is associated to a decrease in their "quality" and caused by firms strategically using the system to generate royalty revenues. Reforming the system to discourage such gaming may be desirable and involve a change in the fee structure or the expansion of the possibilities for opposing strategic patent applications. The problem seems particularly acute in those cases where multiple patented technologies are needed for the production of a new good or technological standard. The risk then is that the royalties for those complementary inputs be set too high. Whether this royalty stacking risk is high and requires public intervention was a matter for debate.
Nov 29, 2007
Urgent need for patent reform?
Is patent reform a fad? Do firms really misuse the patent system? Those were some of the questions addressed by a panel of distinguished researchers during a conference on "patent policy and innovation" organized by TILEC and the University of Bologna, Italy, this November. The speakers (Alfonso Gambardella (Bocconi), Richard Gilbert (Berkeley), John Golden (Texas Law), Dietmar Harhoff (Munich), Gerard Llobet (CEMFI, Madrid), Klaus Schmidt (Munich), Richard Schmalensee (MIT), and Damien Geradin (TILEC)) discussed the evidence showing that the increase in the numbers of patent applications and granted patents is associated to a decrease in their "quality" and caused by firms strategically using the system to generate royalty revenues. Reforming the system to discourage such gaming may be desirable and involve a change in the fee structure or the expansion of the possibilities for opposing strategic patent applications. The problem seems particularly acute in those cases where multiple patented technologies are needed for the production of a new good or technological standard. The risk then is that the royalties for those complementary inputs be set too high. Whether this royalty stacking risk is high and requires public intervention was a matter for debate.