
Mar 30, 2009
Assessing gas market liberalization

Accounting for the crisis
The unfolding of the current financial crisis has raised many questions as to the impact of accounting rules and practices on market efficiency and cyclicality. Have accounting firms failed to be true to their auditing obligations? Are accounting regulations themselves responsible for amplifying the variations in financial asset prices? The research group on accounting at Tilburg University regularly organizes Accounting Camps where academics and high-profile practitioners can discuss topical issues in an intimate setting. This year's Spring Camp, to be held at Tilburg University on April 22, is organized in cooperation with the TILEC-AFM Research Network on financial market regulation, and focuses on the role of regulation in financial reporting. Clive Lennox (HKUST Business School) will examine how auditing firms are themselves inspected. Ray Ball (University of Chicago) will discuss the recent accounting scandals. Jonathan Rogers (University of Chicago) will present evidence on disclosure tone and shareholder litigation. Steven Crawford (Rice University) will study how market forces and legal institutions affect bonding cross-listed firms. The meeting is organized by Tilburg professors Stephan Hollander, Philip Joos and Jeroen Suijs. Attendance is by invitation only. Invitation for the few remaining seats can be requested by e-mail. More details can be found on the camp's webpage .
Trading rules in stock exchange competition
In a recent TILEC discussion paper TILEC member Sofia Johan and co-author Douglas J. Cumming (York University) examine stock exchange trading rules for market manipulation, insider trading and broker agency conduct across countries and over time for 42 stock exchanges around the world. Some stock exchanges have extremely detailed rules which explicitly prohibit specific manipulative practices, while others use less precise and broadly framed rules. The authors investigate whether those rules influence investors' decision to trade on a specific exchange. To this end, the paper examines whether differences in trading velocity across exchanges are attributable to differences in rules. A hypothesis is tested that vague regulations create inefficiency as investors and/or traders are not clear as to which activities are acceptable and which ones are in breach of the spirit of the rules. Conversely, one may argue that detailed regulations create inefficiency as investors and/or traders are able to take advantage of inevitable loopholes. The data show a strongly positive and robust effect of trading rules on trading velocity, suggesting that trading rules are an important information source to consider for explaining differences in trading activity among stock exchanges around the world.
Workshop on auctions: a learning experience

(developed by Jean-Jacques and co-authors), in particular its speed, as measured by the number of bidding rounds it takes to reach the optimal allocation. Sven de Vries (University of Trier) introduced the audience to the use of discrete optimization techniques to study multi-unit auctions. Emiel Maasland (Erasmus University, Rotterdam) presented the (sophisticated) rules governing the auction of the 2.6GHz radio spectrum band to be held by the Dutch government in the near future. The meeting was well-attended and participants got a chance to experience the classical over-bidding effect in several laboratory experiments run by CentERlab director Jan Potters.
Mar 2, 2009
Workshop on competition policy and regulation in media markets
Renewable energy sources, renewed concerns
Energy has come to the forefront of the public debate in the past decade. Renewable energy certificates (RECs) are instruments that allow countries to promote energy generation from renewable sources and can be part of domestic policies aimed at climate change mitigation and adaptation. In a recent TILEC discussion paper TILEC member Panagiotis Delimatsis
discusses the issues raised by the nature of RECs, which can be traded in secondary markets. Concerns arise from the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the multilateral regulation of trade in financial services, notably in the case where World Trade Organization (WTO) Members undertook sweeping commitments in financial services which equally apply to trade in RECs. The alleged dichotomy between trading in emission allowances and trading in RECs may also be problematic. The paper argues that WTO Members may be interested in considering whether a unified approach regarding energy-related services and trading of related financial instruments (such as RECs or emission rights) makes sense in the medium term. Indeed, as things now stand with the current classification system, Members may ultimately realize that they have already undertaken commitments in energy-related sectors,
e.g. in financial services, that they had not intended to liberalize. The paper is to appear in the World Trade Review.
discusses the issues raised by the nature of RECs, which can be traded in secondary markets. Concerns arise from the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the multilateral regulation of trade in financial services, notably in the case where World Trade Organization (WTO) Members undertook sweeping commitments in financial services which equally apply to trade in RECs. The alleged dichotomy between trading in emission allowances and trading in RECs may also be problematic. The paper argues that WTO Members may be interested in considering whether a unified approach regarding energy-related services and trading of related financial instruments (such as RECs or emission rights) makes sense in the medium term. Indeed, as things now stand with the current classification system, Members may ultimately realize that they have already undertaken commitments in energy-related sectors,
e.g. in financial services, that they had not intended to liberalize. The paper is to appear in the World Trade Review.
Settling scores with financial markets
Do financial markets properly price new information? This question has taken on renewed relevance since the outburst of the financial crisis. Soccer clubs listed on the London Stock Exchange provide a unique way of testing stock price reactions to different types of news, as showed by TILEC member Luc Renneboog and co-authors Frédéric Palomino (ENSAE) and Chendi Zhang (Warwick) in a recent discussion paper. For each firm, two pieces of information are released on a weekly basis: experts' expectations about game outcomes through the betting odds, and the game outcomes themselves. The stock market reacts strongly to news about game results, generating significant abnormal returns and trading volumes. There is evidence that the abnormal returns for the winning teams do not reflect rational expectations but are high due to overreactions induced by investor sentiment. This is not the case for losing teams. In contrast, there is no market reaction to the release of new betting information although these betting odds are excellent predictors of the game outcomes. The reasons for this discrepancy are thoroughly investigated by the authors. The paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Corporate Finance.
Entrepreneurship and consumer interests in healthcare markets
Lecture Wolf Sauter
Lecture Marcel Canoy